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Hackers Underworld 2: Forbidden Knowledge
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CUD328D.TXT
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1994-11-01
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Date: July 31, 1991
From: jthomas@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: File 4--Reply to Tom Forester Article
The post by Tom Forester is surprising both for its strident tone and
ill-conceived agenda. Normally, there will be consistency between
scholars' findings and the pronouncements they make derived from such
findings. This is not simply an intellectually ethical practice, but
responsible discourse as well. We all succumb to occasional
hyperbole, factual faux pas, or miswordings that create ambiguity or
misunderstandings--a gap between what we intend to say and what we
actually do say. However, the Forester article is recklessly flawed
and is compounded by the fact that his errors are in an area in which
he claims special expertise. His claims require a detailed response
lest his readers grant the post more credibility than is justified.
It appears that the letter is quite at odds with his book,
(co-authored with Perry Morrison). It is always possible that the
co-author wrote the passages cited below, but when any work
is co-authored, the norm is to assume joint responsibility for
the entirety unless otherwise indicated. There is no indication
that Tom Forester detached himself from any of the book's contents.
What is troublesome is not that Forester seems to disassociate
himself from passages in the work, but that he actually seems
unaware of arguments that bear his name.
The post, as it appeared publicly in several sources on the net,
began as follows:
>A colleague recently published this article in the computer section
>of 'The Australian' newspaper last week. He thought it might interest
>newspaper form.
>
>George Bray [posting for Tom Forester]
>
>
>
>Opinion: "Hackers: 'Clamp Down Now' "
>
>The Australian, 2 July 1991, page 34.
>
Forester's point is quite clear:
>It's about time we got tough with hackers and exposed them for
>the irresponsible electronic vandals they really are.
>
>Jailing a few of these malicious meddlers would set an example to
>other would-be data thieves and help stem the tide of
>computerized anarchism which is threatening to engulf the IT
>industry.
In the space of a few sentences, Forester categorically reduces the
meaning of the term "hacker" to one denoting "vandals," "meddlers,"
"data thieves," and "anarchism." "Hackers" is a broad term referring
on one hand to what Bob Bickford describes as "any person who derives
joy from discovering ways to circumvent limitations" to, on the other,
the cybervandals who trash systems. The broad use of the term to
define any computer behavior that displeases us contributes to public
misunderstanding and to law-enforcement excesses by expanding
categories of people eligible for prosecution. For example, if I have
committed no violation of law, but publicly call myself a "hacker" in
Bob Bickford's sense, such a claim could be adduced as evidence
against me in the event I were to come under investigation.
No definitions are written in stone. However, words have meanings, and
meanings connote images and metaphors. Forester's metaphors reinforce
the ill-considered images reflected in the most abusive search
warrants in several 1990 raids in the U.S. (e.g., Craig Neidorf, Steve
Jackson Games, Len Rose, Ripco BBS). The hacker imagery painted by
Forester has no hues or shades--only black and white icons reflecting
the ancient battle between the forces of light and darkness.
Most hackers aren't "meddlers" or data thieves. Like most crimes,
there is a continuum ranging from simple curiosity to harmful intrusion.
Forester also fails to mention that, whatever the excesses of even the
most malicious intruders, "hackers" are not responsible for the bulk
of computer crime. According to virtually all studies, most "computer
crime" is done from the inside (estimates range from 60-80 pct). A
significant proportion of the remainder is done by computer literate
rip-off artists whose purpose is larceny rather than exploratory
curiosity or illicit--but still relatively benign--behavior. One need
not approve of intrusions to recognize that there are differences
between types of abuse and methods of responding to these different
types.
In his article, Forester makes no distinctions between categories of
"hacker" or types of hacks. He refers simply to "electronic vandals,"
hardly a value-neutral (or accurate) label. This is a radical
departure from _Computer Ethics_ (pp 40-44), in which clear distinctions
are made, an even-handed treatment of the risks and problems is
presented, and "hacking is explicitly distinguished from computer
crime, something not done in his article.
>Breaking into a computer is no different from breaking into your
>neighbour's house. It is burglary plain and simple--though often
>accompanied by malicious damage and theft of information.
>Sometimes--as in the case of stolen credit card numbers--it is
>followed by fraud.
>
>The essence of hacking is that it is about gaining unauthorized
>access to other peoples' systems. It is an activity which has not
>been sanctioned by or approved of by the system's owner, be they
>private or public.
The phrase "plain and simple" usually reflects an attempt to silence
differing views by rejecting at the outset any possibility of
alternative meanings or points of view. The complexity of computer
abuse and the failure of law to catch up with rapidly changing
technology and the problems this creates for law enforcement and
others is plainly obvious but hardly simply resolved by crude
categories and retributionist thinking. Forester forces extreme
examples of disparate behavior into neat bundles, forces a metaphor
(breaking and entering) onto them, and then argues from the metaphor,
not the original behavior. This is legitimate when metaphors are used
to make something unfamiliar more understandable, but when the
metaphor is flawed, or when the metaphor becomes the thing itself,
distortion results. Computer invasion, even in the worst case, is not
analogous to home invasion. Physical presence of an offender and the
corresponding dangers it poses is absent.
A better analogy would be a kid setting up a lemonade stand on
your yard when you weren't looking, or somebody peeking through your
window from their own property across the street with binoculars. The
problem with viewing all inappropriate computer behavior as of the same
magnitude is that it leads to silly analogies. Consider "automotive
technology." We don't have a general category of crime called "auto
crime" and argue that we should lock "auto offenders up." There are
many "auto offenses," ranging from parking tickets, moving violations,
auto-theft, burglarizing autos, using autos in the commission of
another crime, stealing the trade-secrets of auto manufacturers, and
as most teenaged minors know, getting it on in the back seats of them.
Some of these auto-related acts are simply nuisances, others are quite
serious. We distinguish between them and don't call for "setting
examples" by jailing young lovers in a back seat *as well as* drunk
drivers or auto thieves.
Instead of the term "hacker," Forester's argument would be better
served by term "computer intruder," which would allow him to make
distinctions between kinds of intrusion. In law, there are similar
distinctions, and there is nothing *PLAIN AND SIMPLE* about such acts.
Computer intrusion is *NOT* burglarly, even if information is copied.
Forester's inaccurate analogy reflects either the incompetence of one
ignorant of law--rather strange for a self-styled expert on "computer
ethics"--or a cavalier disregard for accuracy which is anathema to
responsible scholarship.
Forester again seems to ignore his own book, which explicitly
challenges such a "plain and simple" analogy:
"Unfortunately, the legal basis of system break-ins
languishes in the dark ages of real locks and doors and
physical fo